crass sectors of the profession, the more familiar refrain is that any crisis is attributable to the fact that the profession once had a shared sense of legal ethics and professional responsibility which has been lost. Having become too much a corporate business than a public vocation, it is urged that the legal profession must revert to this traditional esprit de corps if it is to regain its respectability and stature: lawyers must reclaim the ethical legacy of noble lawyers past.
Like most expressions of nostalgia, this characterisation of the perceived crisis and its proffered solution has some grounding in reality. But it is as much a pious pretence as a genuine remedy for institutional ills. The profession has indeed become more business-like in operation and, as a result, more corporate in attitude; legal services are treated as one more commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace. This tendency has been facilitated by the traditional view of legal ethics which puts service-the belief that lawyers do not have responsibility for the law and its development, but only for the satisfaction of their clients' wishes-before justice. 1 Moreover, it is most definitely not the case that the cure for the perceived professional blight is a return to the values and standards of yesteryear. On the contrary, what is required is the development of a fresh approach to legal ethics that is both sensitive to the changing shape and style of modem legal practice and, at the same time, demands that lawyers aspire to a more diverse and critical selfimage. Accordingly, mindful that the homogeneity of lawyers is beginning to be replaced by more diverse personnel, the theme of this article will be to assess the implications that the challenge of a fragmented society and legal profession holds for the critical development of a transformed practice of professional responsibility.
After sketching the different demands and design of a fragmented society, I will concentrate on how the legal profession itself is beginning to fragment and what that means for existing accounts of legal ethics. In particular, my focus will be on how it is vital to rethink present understandings of lawyers' ethical personae and to canvass future possibilities for a more compelling vision of a professional modus vivendi. Emphasising the Canadian predicament, I will argue that a fragmented society deserves a fragmented legal profession which, in tum, warrants a more fragmented idea and implementation of legal ethics. There must be a shift of emphasis from professional regulation to personal responsibility. As well as indicating the shape and direction that such a revised ethical stance might take, I explore the more substantive and concrete consequences for legal education and professional practice. My ambition is not to promote a particular set of ethical outcomes or inculcate a specific mode of professional responsibility; it is to challenge students and lawyers to develop a professional modus vivendi of their own that constructs as it constantly challenges and re-works an appropriate professional attitude and practice. In the same way that there is no one or unchanging way to be a good person, there is no one or unchanging way to be a good lawyer: each and every lawyer must be capable of developing a style and substance of lawyering that incorporates a continuing dialogue-with oneself, clients, other lawyers, other professionals, and the community at large-about what counts as good lawyering. The central question is whether it is ever acceptable that lawyers might, can or should act in a professional capacity in such a way that it would be contrary to their own moral values.
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Traditional ethics
The traditional image of the ethical lawyer has remained largely static and unchanged for many decades. It is centred on the idea that lawyers are super-technocrats; they possess an expert set of talents and techniques which they deploy for the advantage of those people who hire them. Regarding themselves as being neutral on the substance and form of the law, their task is very much to apply the law, perhaps to criticise it a little, but most certainly not to make it. Lawyers' commitment is to the legal system which, even when they are working around and within it, must be accepted as given.
Almost indifferent to who their clients are, lawyers think of themselves as more chosen than choosing. The relationship between lawyer and client is built upon trust and respect: clients are to trust lawyers to act in the clients' best interests and, in.return, lawyers will respect the clients' autonomy. It is not for lawyers to impinge upon the clients' autonomy, but to act on behalf of the clients to realise their interests and inspirations. The lawyer is expected to treat all clients exactly the same in the sense that they are each citizens who have had their rights infringed and want relief or vindication. Advocacy and action tends, therefore, to be standardised and routinised. Insofar as lawyer and clients are from different cultures and classes, lawyers are expected to bridge the gap by personal empathy and professional solidarity.
Although the validity and merit of this ethical self-image is almost taken for granted by most lawyers and jurists, it is based on certain foundational premises about law, society and ways of thinking about them.
Like all operating assumptions, they are more controversial than many traditionalists care to think or acknowledge. Some of the more important ones are that:
• Law is objective and certain-the hallmark of good lawyers is considered to be found in their cultivation of rule-craft in which the ability to identify the extant rules of the legal system and apply them to particular situations is paramount. As such, law has considerable stability and independence, offers operationally determinate guidance to the trained lawyer, and is institutionally distinct from the more open-minded disputations around ideological politics.
• All clients are to be treated the same-all clients have pre-established interests and come to lawyers to have their rights vindicated. The task of lawyers is to accept any clients that seek their services and to utilise their common expertise in pursuing the interests of their clients in such a way that justice will be done and the Rule of Law upheld.
• The criminal trial is the paradigm of legal responsibility-the basic dynamic of the legal system is traceable to the adversarial contest between individual and state in the criminal process. While the roles of lawyers vary in civil trials and non-adversarial contexts, their basic responsibilities can be extrapolated from the institutional setting of the criminal brief.
• Lawyering is an apolitical undertaking-lawyers pursue their clients' interests through the extant rules, procedures and venues of law: overt politicisation is severely frowned upon. While lawyers engage in struggles that arise in and have consequences for politics, lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate lawyers in any political process and that insists upon no commitment to any particular ideology.
As attractive and as comforting as this traditional image of legal ethics and professional responsibility may be to legal practitioners, its problems are manifest and manifold. It fails theoretically, empirically and ideologically-it is based upon a formalistic theory of law that is largely discredited and defunct as a serious attempt to understand law and its operation. It describes a version of legal practice that no longer has any empirical validity or historical accuracy, if it ever did have; and it defends both its informing theory and governing practice of lawyering as apolitical in such a way that merely serves to underline its very definite ideological commitments. 3 However, for present purposes of highlighting the traditional model of the ethical lawyer, there are two underlying premises which are most pertinent--one is the notion of a reasonably homogenous and uniform legal profession and the other is the idea of a role-differentiated and rule-based morality.
First, the traditional image of the ethical lawyer asks lawyers to subordinate their personal morality and identity to the standardised requirements of a role-defined rule-based morality. It assumes that legal professionals will appreciate and actualise the demands of a roledifferentiated morality in which lawyers' duties are exclusively bounded by the law and the professional code of conduct on one side and the clients' interests on the other. It is a two-dimensional moral universe in which lawyers are no more expected to intrude their own personal values than actors or butlers in the performance of their duties. 4 Such a notion allows persons to claim moral legitimacy for actions that might be considered illegitimate in other, different roles and contexts. Moreover, once in this professional role, lawyers are required to treat morality in the same way that they deal with law-as an exhaustive body of rules that can be formally applied to resolve the most recalcitrant of difficulties and dilemmas. Consequently, in the traditional approach, there is very little space for reflection or engagement;
reference to the professional codes is intended to provide definitive and authoritative answers.
Secondly, the traditional image and professional codes are (not so subtly) underpinned with the view of the white, male lawyer as an independent professional who deals with a range of legal tasks and who is driven as much by civic pride as commercial ambition; lawyers are a homogeneous group who engage in broadly similar work. This notion of the fungible lawyer who inhabits, with only slight variation and adaptation, all the offices and activities throughout society is a myth. The reality is that, while such anachronisms exist, they are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there is no longer one image of the lawyer; they are an increasingly heterogenous and stratified bunch whose backgrounds, ambitions and standards are much less uniform than was previously the case. However, the legal profession is becoming more diversified, it remains a very stratified profession in which the white male lawyers still exercise the most control over the regulation and self-image of the profession. It is to the critique of these two premises-the existence of a homogenous legal profession and the worth of a role-differentiated and rulebased morality-that I now turn.
Fragmented profession
Whether there ever has been one type of lawyer or one kind of legal practice, Legal practice is shaped by many factors, both external and internal to it. In recent decades, the Canadian legal profession has been strongly influenced by a variety of environmental forces over which it has very little control: decreasing state regulation; the juridification of dispute-resolution; the re-structuring of the economy; the extent of globalisation; and the spread of computerisation and information technology. Not surprisingly, these external forces have been mediated through a set of internal filters that affect their impact on the workings of the legal profession. 7 The first thing to note is there are certain forms of legal practice that are much more prestigious than others and certain differences have some definite implications for legal ethics.
In particular, not only do the elite firms have greater access to the law society bodies that develop the rules and culture of the profession, but the sole practitioner is much more likely to be subject to formal monitoring by the profession. In short, big-time lawyers establish the standards of good lawyering and ensure that small-time lawyers live up to them. A refusal to abandon the assumption of a homogeneous profession, even in the face of a statistically diverse one, will not only be mismatched to the needs of the public and the profession, but will also exacerbate stratification and hierarchy in the profession.
These changes worked by the external forces operating on the structure and constitutes law, and the professional contexts in which these arise. To be a legal professional is to enter into a community that has developed a shared set of normative practices and expectations that it is authorised or prepared to enforce in the face of recalcitrant behaviour. While several devices are used to curb and monitor lawyers' behaviour, codes of professional conduct lie at the heart of the profession's focus on legal ethics and responsibility. The reasons for having codes of professional conduct are fairly obvious-to educate lawyers on communal expectations; to affect behaviour; and to offer a basis for discipline. However, law societies have tended to develop and adapt their professional rules in response to problems that arise: it has been a reactive and unambitious approach that lacks any underlying direction or purpose. Some critics have insisted that such codes are little more than ethical windowdressing; they serve to legitimate what lawyers do and impose control over economic competition. What passes for talk of ethical standards is, at best, a stylised form of professional regulation and, at worst, a self-serving paean to professional prestige. 8 In short, professional bodies are, through their codes and rules, often as interested in enforcing collegial conformity as fostering a sense of ethical purpose; there is a lingering suspicion that the rules do more to promote professional self-interest and little to affect ethical behaviour or debate among practising lawyers.
To read any of the provincial codes of professional conduct is to encounter a series of pronouncements that are long on righteous aspiration and vague generalities, but short on serious instruction and concrete guidance.
It is a case of not seeing the ethical forest for the law-like trees. Although lawyers are weighed down with discrete and detailed directives on this or that matter, there is little to counsel the floundering or jaded lawyer in establishing an overall and professional modus vivendi. Like the formalist lawyering that many claim to embody and extol, ethics is reduced to a technical compliance with a set of simple do's and don'ts-more of a shopping list than a genuine effort to inculcate a style and substance of legal practice that addresses the whole lawyer not merely the occasional legal transaction. It is as much about conformity as it is about conscience. Lawyers approach ethics in the same way that they approach law-as a set of rules to be mastered and manipulated to serve the purpose in hand. Indeed, under the sway of a legalistic mentality, the teaching of legal ethics and responsibility is more like a course on office management; it is as much about techniques in filing and organisation as it is about thinking through dilemmas and difficulties.
Even assuming that the various codes are treated as representing a serious attempt at ethical instruction and control, an exclusive concentration on the rules is misplaced. There is little to be gained by providing an elaborate and exhaustive annotation of the rules of professional conduct because, not only has this been adequately done, but it ignores the very real fact that the influence on lawyers' daily routines and rituals is small: the constant attention to and re-drafting of the rules is of decreasing marginal utility. 12 Accordingly, compliance with law, in both its spirit and letter, does not amount to acceptable ethical behaviour: professional morality is more than law-abiding conformity. The fact that most decisions and practices by lawyers allow for a variety of manoeuvres or results means that lawyers need to develop a professional facility to comprehend and handle such challenges; there is rarely an obvious or incontestable path to follow.
Although it is often forgotten by most lawyers, the study of legal ethics is a branch of ethics generally; it is not a subject unto itself. At its broadest, ethics involves a meditation on what is wrong and right and, most importantly, how such standards are arrived at and validated. Traditionally, the task was to elaborate and justify a set of ethical norms that provide an authoritative code that people could consult and follow in resolving difficult dilemmas. However, faith in the possibility of sketching such a body of enduring and universally valid rules has been waning. There is now the less absolutist and more sceptical acceptance that ethics is a much more situational practice that cannot claim objective or neutral justification. As with general ethics, the prevailing standards of right and wrong do not exhaust ethical inquiry into legal professionals' behaviour; those standards must themselves be subject to scrutiny and challenge. The different ethical theories seek to examine critically conventional moral judgements and practices; they offer methods and devices through which to justify or condemn particular moral answers to controversies or dilemmas. There are almost as many ethical theories as there are ethical philosophers. Inmany instances, all ethical theories will converge on a similar set of generally accepted norms and standards of moral conduct. However, many moral theorists contend that a moral approach to life consists of more than a hell-or-highwater allegiance to one overarching code of moral rules and principles; there will be a pragmatic willingness to resist hard-and-fast solutions that are supposed to work in all situations.
None of this should be taken to mean that ethical behaviour and decisionmaking is condemned to be irrational or arbitrary, only that what counts and operates as reason is never outside of its informing context. In this way, legal ethics can be viewed less as a fixed and independent code of professional conduct and more as continuing practice within which lawyers construct acceptable norms of behaviour as they struggle to comply with them. To be an ethical lawyer involves more than learning and applying a set of rules; it also demands the cultivation of a critical reflection upon the professional role and responsibilities of lawyers. In short, a fully ethical practice requires an independent sense of moral virtue that involves the life-long development of personal moral character. Because there is no one answer to ethical dilemmas, it does not mean that reasoning can be abandoned or that "anything goes".
In ethical debate, a wide range of answers to arguments can be supported by sophisticated chains of reasoning: moral reasoning is not, therefore, something that stands outside or in judgement on moral decisionmaking, it is made and re-made in the situational process of moral 
Personal and professional
From a sceptical perspective, therefore, legal ethics is not about perfecting universalisable and enduring codes of conduct. It is about developing a transformative and pluralistic practice that respects the contingent and the particular and allows for diverse answers and appreciations. The traditional concepts and practices of honesty, confidentiality, trust, etc. remain most pertinent, but they are given meaning and bite as the context varies; they are fundamental, but not absolute values in the legal ethics vocabulary. As Lon
Fuller pointed out, there is a vast difference between a professional duty that is based on "duty" as opposed to "aspiratiori. 13 Whereas the former focuses on compliance with a set of rules and concentrates on what is not to be done rather than what ought to be done, the latter speaks in more positive terms and asks professionals to develop a style of practice that inspires ethical conduct rather than merely avoids unethical acts. The traditional emphasis on code-based morality breeds a mentality that is more concerned with delineating how far a lawyer can go without engaging in unethical conduct: it tends to privilege social conformity over efforts to build moral character. It is important therefore that lawyers do not internalise the view that it is ethical to do whatever is not prohibited by the professional rules; this is an impoverished and thin view of professional responsibility and legal ethics.
In contrast to understanding the demands of legal ethics as being satisfied by the memorisation of appropriate institutionalised responses to particular factsituations, it ought to be about developing a framework within which to understand and reflect about the inevitable ethical dilemmas that acting as a professional throws up. As such, legal ethics should be a vibrant and dynamic way of being a lawyer that is not something that lawyers simply refer to in stereotypical situations, but is an integral dimension of what it means to be a good lawyer that pervades and infiltrates professionals' whole way of thinking about and acting as lawyers. In developing such a notion and practice of professional ethics, the challenge is neither to abandon a sense of personal morality and defer all ethical responsibility to the unique role and status of the legal professional nor to adhere entirely to the dictates of one's personal conscience and ignore the special responsibilities that attach to being a professional. It is a matter of creating a balance between the two such that it is possible to bring together the professional and the personal in a legal ethics that satisfies the pushes of personal morality and the pulls of professional conduct. To do otherwise is either to relinquish personal responsibility entirely to the self-interested norms of official codes of professional conduct or to ignore entirely the genuine framework of professional responsibilities that must influence and affect the dictates of personal conscience. It most definiteJy is not a choice between law and morality, such that the true professional must abandon all efforts to be a good person in being a good lawyer.
Instead of positing professional ethics and personal morality as being entirely separate and, at times, being in direct conflict, it is much more useful and desirable to view one's ethical responsibility as a professional to be part of one's personal morality as an individual. Having developed a personal sense of moral integrity, lawyers should not be faced with the possibility that it will be jeopardised rather than reinforced by the need to subordinate personal values to professional goals. 14 To ask lawyers to forgo moral judgement is to reduce them to amoral technicians with significant drawbacks and limitations-the practice and defence of a role-differentiation is only sustainable if there is widespread support for and confidence in the institutional processes of law, and this is surely suspect. Ignoring moral considerations, lawyers will begin to be more competitive and less cooperative, more opportunistic and less principled, and more selfregarding and less committed. Moreover, on the basis that lawyers tend to identify more than most with their jobs, the amorality of their professional role will begin to infect their personal lives-the amorality will become its own impoverished morality by default: "lawyers' sensitivities can atrophy or narrow to fit the constricted universe dictated by role". 15 Strict adherence to a strong role-differentiation asks lawyers to engage in a form of moral schizophrenia. This has considerable costs to lawyers-their sense of moral judgement atrophies; they lose track of what is and is not important; and their clients are reduced to nothing more than fee-generating opportunities.
Accordingly, while legal ethics does not simply collapse into personal morality, there has to be a recognition that "role-differentiated behaviour" has a legitimate claim on the attention of those who strive to be ethical lawyers.
Although lawyers must assume personal responsibility for their professional activities, it does not mean that they must only do as a lawyer what they would do as an individual (which, in many cases, might tum out to be very is taken on, the lawyer does have some responsibility to treat that person differently than other persons; they are engaged in a special relationship that lawyers cannot simply abandon as and when they choose. Notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary, lawyers can choose whatever clients they wish. In Canada, there is no equivalent to the English cab-rank rule which requires barristers to accept any client at a reasonable fee in their area of expertise.
Consequently, lawyers must take responsibility about and for the clients that they choose to represent.
Practical implications
The requirement for ethical behaviour and moral character flows from the idea that law is a profession and one in which its members are trustees for the public good in the administration of justice. Dating back to Rome's Theodesian Code and Anglo-Saxon England, lawyers have always been required to take an oath that they will fulfil their professional responsibilities in a good and virtuous manner. This is still the case today. New lawyers have to be certified as being of good character and to swear an oath upon admission that they will uphold the highest standards of moral integrity. A central problem is that, as one critic astutely observes, the inquiry into moral character is both too early and too late in the overall professional process. 18 Occurring on entry into the Bar admission courses, it arises before There is an urgent need to stimulate the moral imagination and cultivate each person's sense of moral responsibility, such that they are able to develop a moral facility that is capable of recognising ethical dilemmas, analysing them, and responding to them in a responsible and realistic way. A pervasive difficulty in achieving this is that legal ethics is more about responsibilities than rights and, therefore, does not sit easily or well with much of the legal education that lawyers receive.
Insofar as the practice of legal ethics is in disarray, the law societies and the law schools must shoulder a considerable share of the blame for failing to provide an institutional setting for establishing a sophisticated understanding of professional responsibility and its demands. Few law schools take very seriously the need to offer training of a mandatory or optional kind to its graduates. Certainly, the extent and sophistication of courses in legal ethics comes nowhere close to mirroring those of the substantive courses.
Furthermore, the courses that do exist tend to treat the teaching of legal ethics as if it were simply one more course, with the same intellectual ambitions and pedagogical techniques as business association or torts. In an important sense, although law schools have not taken the teaching of legal ethics seriously, they have still instilled within students and lawyers a certain sense of professional ethics. Indeed, law schools cannot avoid teaching legal ethics as "the very act of teaching ... creates images of law and lawyering when we teach doctrine through cases and hypotheticals". 19 Unfortunately, reinforced by the general rule-centred attitude to the study of legal doctrine, law students settle neatly into thinking of legal ethics as involving a similar process of role-detachment and legalistic application.
To their credit, however, the law societies and law schools have begun to take their own responsibility in meeting this shortcoming much more seriously. Stirred into action by some first-rate studies and reform proposals, 20 there is now a compulsory component in most provincial Bar admission courses. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable way to go as instruction remains closely tied to the rote-learning of the codes and the tendency to treat legal ethics the same as other subjects remains pronounced. All in all, therefore, the efforts to prepare young lawyers for the ethical rigours of legal practice are still very limited and more an afterthought than a core feature of the curriculum. It will take a sea-change in both the scope and substance of courses taught and the style and pedagogy through which they are presented.
As well as altering their attitudes and approach to the teaching of legal ethics, law societies must encourage their members to adopt a much more expansive understanding of their ethical responsibilities. It can do this in a number of ways. At an institutional level, lawyers can be constantly reminded that they must not neglect or overlook the opportunity to converse with other lawyers. This can be done by proliferating the forums-in law schools, in professional gatherings, in law firms, etc.-within which dialogue and engagement can be nurtured and thrive. In this way, lawyers might explore their own moral intuitions in the testing context of others' views without risking public criticism or risk. Also, it can be made clear to lawyers that their moral obligations as professionals extend beyond concern with their own individual actions and should encompass a responsibility to monitor the actions of other lawyers. In this way, professional responsibility is as much a collective as well as personal undertaking in which each lawyer should contribute to the moral health of the profession as a whole.
Conclusion
As with so much else, de Tocqueville was not only half right about his assessment of (American) lawyers when he wrote, but his conclusions remain equally valid and invalid today. He was surely accurate in his pronouncement that lawyers constituted the new aristocracy of society. However, he was well wide of the mark in believing that such an elite status was warranted because the legal profession functioned as the enlightened and sensible guardians of the public good. 21 Although traditional versions of legal ethics are still defended in the name of public service, there are few lawyers who conduct their daily professional lives in such a spirit. It is unrealistic to imagine or expect that every lawyer will, like Socrates, only be guided by the need to do right rather than wrong: most lawyers are reasonably concerned about their jobs, paying their mortgages, providing for their kids, etc. Indeed, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that lawyers will hold to ethical principles when it is in their interests to do so or, more accurately, when their financial considerations coincide with their ethical ones. 22 However, it is neither unreasonable nor unrealistic to expect that they can be persuaded, collectively and individually, to accept the noble challenge of redeeming the legal profession's moral standing and of fashioning a fresh image of legal ethics and professional responsibility that serves a fragmented society.
At the heart of any efforts to reaffirm the profession in its own and the public's moral esteem must be the commitment to emphasise that lawyers lawyer understands that ethical considerations are at the heart of lawyering, not a peripheral concern. To be a good person and a good lawyer need not be the oxymoron that Plato and more modern pessimists seem to believe it to be.
